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INTRODUCTION
“[E]very unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” 1 Just as author Leo Tolstoy recognized
in 1878, families have always been complicated. No family is more complicated than when
issues like addiction, unemployment, or homelessness are involved. When state agencies deem
families struggling with these issues as “unhappy,” they are pulled into the nexus of the child
welfare system, where parents and children are separated. Much like the recent “defund the
police” demands of community activists involved with the Black Lives Matter movement,
advocates are calling for a “defunding of the child welfare system.”2 More specifically,
advocates are demanding the reallocation of funding to family preservation services. 3 In this
Paper, I propose a redefining of the obligations of the state in family intervention in order to shift
the approach to child welfare from a punitive system, which punishes families for being
complicated, to a cooperative system, which treats imperfect parents as redeemable and
prioritizes the reunification of families.
In the first part of this Paper, I will review the legal history of child protection and state
intervention in the United States and how it has evolved following the passage of the Adoption
and Safe Families Act (ASFA) of 1997. 4 I will highlight the inadequacies of the system by
examining the mechanics of the timeline for filing a petition to terminate parental rights, which is
statutorily set by the Act when a child has been in foster care for 15 out of 22 months.5 Referred
to as the 15/22-months rule, I will explain how the timeline is too short for a parent to address
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Leo Tolstoy, Anna Karenina 1, Penguin Classics (2004).
Rashawn Ray, What does ‘defund the police’ mean and does it have merit?, Brookings.edu (Jun. 19, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/06/19/what-does-defund-the-police-mean-and-does-it-have-merit/.
3 For a brief argument for reallocation of funding to support services, see Dorothy Roberts, How the Child Welfare
System Polices Black Mothers, 15 Scholar & Feminist Online J. 3 (2019).
4 Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997).
5 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E).
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the problems cited by state agency workers without more vigorous assistance, or “reasonable
efforts” from the state.
In the second part of this Paper, I will explain the concept of “reasonable efforts” and how
state legislatures and courts have defined the term to assess what kind of obligation that places
on the state. I will show how the low bar set by the current interpretation of “reasonable effort s”
contributes to a ruling in favor of termination of parental rights.
In the third part of this Paper, I will discuss the impact of the 15/22-months rule on families
and parents. I will shine a light on the issues parents face as they race to complete case plans
before the state petitions to terminate their parental rights. The easy solution would be to repeal
or extend the timeline. However, I reject this solution because extension would allow states to
further impose upon families with no objective in sight. Further, children should not have to
linger in foster care until a disposition in their case because this causes harm to the child and to
the integrity of their family.
In the fourth part of this Paper, I review the current state of federal child welfare funding and
how the money is being allocated and used by states. I review the present and future mechanisms
states may use to provide direct assistance to families to prevent family separation. I call for an
imposition of a greater obligation on states to spend money on what will help parents ameliorate
issues in the short term, instead of pouring funding into investigation, foster care, and adoption.
Finally, in the last part of this Paper, I propose that the solution is to turn our focus away
from “family regulation” to “family support.” Many of the issues leading up to termination of
parental rights can best be addressed through imposing a higher standard upon the states to
affirmatively engage in “reasonable efforts” to reunify the family. The standard and definition
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proposed to replace “reasonable efforts” in this Paper, “conscious efforts,” strikes a balance
between the financial capabilities of the state and the seriousness of state intervention and its
effect on the family. I believe we should reinvest in families by ensuring that the preventative
services we have in place are not simply “adequate,” but satisfactory. I believe the state is better
situated to repair the quality of services. I suggest states divert the funds sustaining foster care
programs into direct financial assistance, effective addiction, mental health, education, and job
training programs, and overall support services for parents.
I.

History

As early as 1923, the Supreme Court held that the right to family privacy is a substantive due
process right protected under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 6
Parents have the right to the “care, custody, and control of their child.” 7 The parental right to
make decisions regarding family and child-rearing is one that the Court has recognized as
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”8 This parental right is based in the implicit
right to privacy, which the Court has recognized encompasses certain personal decisions
individuals may make without unjustified government interference.9 Courts largely do not
intervene when parents have made decisions on behalf of their child. 10 For example, in Troxel,
the Court reversed a visitation order granted to the grandparents over the objection of a mother
who ceased visitation between them and her children.11 The Court stated that a judge may not

6

Meyer v. Nebraska , 262 U.S. 390, 399-01 (1923).
Id. See also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
8 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, , 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
9 Carey v. Population Servs., Intern., 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977).
7

Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir.1977) (A family has a right “to remain together without the
coercive interference of the awesome power of the state.”).
11 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 75.
10
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substitute their own judgment for that of a parent without a finding of parental unfitness. 12 Fit
parents are presumed to be acting in the best interests of their children. 13
However, the Court has explicitly stated that the rights of a parent are not absolute. 14 In
Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court had to decide whether a child labor law interfered with the
child and guardian’s free exercise of religion.15 However, the decision of the Court had farreaching implications regarding the rights of parents to their children. 16 The Court stated that
“families are not beyond regulation[…] and the state may restrict [the authority of the parent].” 17
The Court has held that families are subject to state regulation when the child is being abused or
neglected.18 The Supreme Court in Florida stated that “the right to be a parent carries with it
important responsibilities to be able for care for one’s children without causing them serious
harm.”19 The best interest of the child will always prevail when a parent has put the wellbeing of
the child at risk.20 However, the state may not infringe on parental authority “simply because
they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.” 21
When the state alleges that a parent has abused or neglected their child, the court must
balance three interests: that of the parent, that of the child, and that of the state. 22 The Lassiter
Court emphasized the importance of the constitutional rights of parents, declaring them “an
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Id. at 68-69.
Id. at 72-73.
14 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S 158, 166 (1944).
15 Id. at 164.
16 Id. at 160 (Note that the appellant in Prince was the aunt and legal guardian of the child).
17 Id. at 166.
18 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979).
19 S.M. v. Dep’t of Child. and Fams., 202 So. 3d 769, 778 (Fla . 2016).
20 Id.
21 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
22 Id. at 759-61.
13
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interest far more precious than any property interest.” 23 Like the parent, the child also has an
“interest in preserving the parent-child relationship.”24 The state has a compelling government
interest in the well-being of the child.25 Further, when the state removes a child from their parent,
the state has an interest in ensuring permanency for the child. 26 State intervention in a family
depends on the level of risk of actual or imminent harm to the child. 27 Varying levels of
intervention include temporary removal of a child from their family and the provision of in-home
services.28 The Supreme Court of Utah noted that some cases may have few options for
improving the family, but where there are “less-permanent arrangements” short of termination of
parental rights, courts should consider them.29 When the issues that led to removal remain
unresolved, the state may petition for termination of parental rights. 30
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Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 38 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting May
v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953). See also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753 (“Parents retain a vital interest in
preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life.”).
24 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]t seems to me extremely likely that, to the extent parents and
families have fundamental liberty interests in preserving such intimate relationships, so, too, do children have these
interests, and so, too, must their interests be balanced in the equation.”); Duchesne, 566 F.2d at 825 (“[T]he
reciprocal rights of both parent and children [include the interest] of the children in not being dislocated from the
‘emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association’ with the parent.”). See also Matter of
Welfare of A. M. C., 920 N.W.2d 648, 657 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018).
25

Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766.
Id.
27 James M. Gaudin, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum . Servs., Child neglect: A guide for intervention (Children’s
Bureau 1993), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/usermanuals/neglect-93/ (Explaining how some families have
issues that require long-term CPS intervention, whereas others may require short-term intervention, which may
include “support services such as such as child care, single parent support groups, parenting education, and the CPS
caseworker's helping relationship.”).
28 Nat’l Acad. of Sci., Engineering, and Med., New Directions in Child Abuse and Neglect Research, 176 (Nat’l
Acad. Press 2014), https://doi.org/10.17226/18331. (“Children found to be abused or neglected may remain in their
own home, but those assessed as not being safe in their own home are placed in out -of-home care. Initially, such
care is almost always considered to be temporary[.]”).
29 Interest of B.T.B., 472 P.3d 827, 841 (Utah 2020).
30 For instance, Texas provides that the state may move for termination of parental rights when it proves by clear and
convincing evidence that the child has been in state custody for nine months a nd a parent has failed to accomplish
the tasks set forth in the court-ordered case plan so the child may be returned home. TEX. FAM. CODE §
161.001(b)(1)(O) (West 2019).
26
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A. Parental Rights and Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings
The holding of Prince and subsequent cases provides the legal foundation and justification
for the existence of the child welfare system. The state, acting in its role as parens patriae, may
interfere with the rights of parents to their children in order to protect the child from harm. 31
When the issues that prompted removal remain unresolved, the state initiates proceedings against
the parent in court.32 The dispute becomes one between the parent and the state, where the state
represents its interests and that of the child. 33
Termination of parental rights is considered an extraordinary remedy, involving the
severance of the legal relationship between the parent and the child, making the parent a legal
stranger to their child.34 Termination of parent rights proceedings are the most formal
proceedings in family court and considered “final and irrevocable.”35 Only 13 states statutorily
allow a parent to petition for reinstatement of their parental rights. 36 The Supreme Court has
described termination of parental rights proceedings as “working a unique type of deprivation.” 37
This is due to the legal ramifications of a finding against a parent of unfitness, which include,

31

Prince, 321 U.S. at 168.
For an example of a case where the state initiated termination of parental rights proceedings against a parent who
did not resolve the issues that prompted removal, see, e.g. In re: Welfare of Children of R.W., 678 N.W.2d 49
(Minn. 2004).
33 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 761.
34 Id. at 745.
35 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 121 (1982).
36 Reinstatement of Parental Rights State Statute Summary, National Conference of State Legislatures (Jan. 17,
2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/reinstatement-of-parental-rights-state-statute-sum.aspx (Only
13 states statutorily provide an option for reinstatement of parental rights following termination -- Alaska, Colorado,
California, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, North Carolina, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, and
Washington).
37 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27. An Ohio appellate court also described termination of parental rights as “the family law
equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal case.” In re Smith, 601 N.E.2d 45, 55 (Ohio. Ct. App. 1991).
32
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among other consequences, automatic termination of parental rights to future children in many
states.38
To proceed with termination of parental rights, the state must first show, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the subject parent is unfit. 39 There are several grounds for termination
of parental rights.40 Grounds that appear in state statutes generally fall under a form of physical
abuse, emotional abuse, or neglect.41 Once the state has established through these proofs that the
subject parent is unfit, the state must also show that termination of parental rights is in the best
interest of the child.42 Courts have found that termination of parental rights is in the best interest
of the child where it is “the least restrictive means of protecting the child .”43 Courts have found
that termination of parental rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child where the
state made a “good faith effort to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.” 44 In addition to
satisfying this constitutional framework, states that accept federal monies to aid in funding their
child welfare system must also comply with federal statutory requirements, the most significant
of which is ASFA.45
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See, e.g., State ex. rel. State Off. for Servs. to Child. and Fams. v. Chapman, 8 P.3d 243, 247 (Or. 2000) (Court
affirmed termination of parental rights of mother whose rights to two oldest children were previously terminated);
State ex. rel. Child. Youth & Fa ms. Dep’t v. Amy B., 61 P.3d 845, 850 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (Court found that
statute invalidating the parental rights of a parent who had a prior termination of parental rights was valid because
“there is a real relationship between the past conduct [prior termination] and the current abilities.”).
39 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 25.
40 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Child Welfare Info. Gateway, Grounds for Involuntary Termination of
Parental Rights: State Statutes (Children’s Bureau 2017), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/groundtermin.pdf
41 For examples of state statutory ground for termination of parental rights, see TEX. FAM. C ODE ANN. § 161.001
(WEST 2017) and CAL. WELF. & I NST. CODE § 300 (WEST 2016).
42 Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Fams., 431 U.S. 816, 862–63
(1977) (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment)).
43 K.D. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 242 So.3d 522, 523 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) (whether termination is the “least
restrictive means of protecting the child”). See also New Jersey Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 952 A.2d 436,
447 (2008) (whether termination “will not do more harm than good to the child”).
44 A.F. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 276 So.3d 61, 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019).
45 For requirements states must meet to receive federal funding, 42 U.S.C. § 671 (2019).
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B. Circumstances Leading to State Intervention
It is a commonly held assumption that child welfare cases overwhelmingly comprise
physical abuse. However, physical abuse only accounted for 13% of all child maltreatment cases
in the United States in 2018.46 Meanwhile, neglect accounted for 64% of all child maltreatment
cases.47 Advocates characterize most cases as “poverty alone” cases, meaning that the child is
removed due to a lack of adequate food, shelter or clothing resulting from the parent’s economic
need.48 Poverty is often treated as the result of individual choices and not a by-product of a
capitalistic system.49 Unsurprisingly, most of the families involved in the child welfare system
suffer from poverty.50 The high representation of impoverished families within the child welfare
system can be attributed to their increased likelihood of contact with entities that require
mandatory reporting, such as public schools, emergency rooms, and some homeless shelters. 51
The relationship between poverty and race in the child welfare system cannot be
overlooked, since a disproportionate number of families represented are Black and Brown.52 As
of 2019, Black children make up thirty-three percent of the children in foster care, despite
accounting for only fifteen percent of the child population in the United States. 53 African

46

Kathleen Creamer, The Importance of Family Bonds and Kinship Care, Juv. L. Ctr. (Sep. 10, 2020)
https://jlc.org/news/investing-youth-and-families-importance-family-bonds-and-kinship-care-blog-series-national.
47 Id.
48 Naomi R. Cahn, Children's Interests in A Familial Context: Poverty, Foster Care, and Adoption , 60 Ohio St. L.J.
1189, 1198-99 (1999).
49 Shervin Assari, Why poverty is not a personal choice, but a reflection of society, The Conversation (Jun. 30, 2017
5:10PM), https://theconversation.com/why-poverty-is-not-a-personal-choice-but-a-reflection-of-society-79552, Pam
Fesser, Housing Secretary Ben Carson Says Poverty Is A 'State Of Mind', NPR (May 25, 2017 3:50PM),
https://www.npr.org/2017/05/25/530068988/ben-carson-says-poverty-is-a-state-of-mind.
50 Dorothy E. Roberts, Child Welfare and Civil Rights, 585 Fac. Scholarship at Penn Law 171, 175 (2003).
51 Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and Class in the Child Protection
System an Essay, 48 S.C. L. Rev. 577, 584 (1997) (Poor families are more susceptible to state intervention because
they lack power and resources and because they are more directly involved with governmental agencies.). See also
Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 423, 433 (1983).
52 Roberts, supra note 50, at 175.
53 Disproportionality and Disparity in Child Welfare, National Conference of State Legislatures (Sep. 28, 2020),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/disproportionality-and-disparity-in-child-welfare.aspx.
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American parents are more likely to have their parental rights terminated than white parents. 54
Native American children are also disproportionately represented in the child welfare system. 55
Black and Hispanic children also face high poverty rates. 56 In 2019, twenty-five percent of Black
children and twenty percent of Hispanic children under the age of eighteen lived below the
poverty level.57
By and large, substance abuse has overtaken the child welfare system, becoming the most
cited problem and underlying contributor to other cited problems, primarily parental neglect. 58 In
1999, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) found that almost two-thirds of
substantiated cases of maltreatment involved substance abuse. 59 Unfortunately, the number of
cases has only increased in recent years. The Adoption and Foster Care Reporting System annual
report found that the rate of children entering foster care due to substance abuse increased by five
percent from 2016 to 2017.60 Out of 268,212 children, over 96,000 –one in three—children
entered foster care due to substance abuse. 61 In Knoxville County, Tennessee, Juvenile Court
judge Honorable Tim Irwin noted that “[termination of parental rights] cases [involving opiates]

54

Christopher Wildeman et. al., The Cumulative Prevalence of Termination of Parental Rights for U.S. Children,
2000–2016, 25 Child Maltreatment 32-42 (2019) (Study found that African American children are 2.4 times more
likely than White children to experience the termination of parental rights.).
55 Disproportionality, supra note 53. The termination of parental rights of American Indian children is dealt with
under the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1912, which is beyond the scope of this Paper.
56 Valerie Wilson, Racial disparities in income and poverty remain largely unchanged amid strong income growth
in 2019, Econ. Pol. Inst. (Sep. 16, 2020, 10:49AM), https://www.epi.org/blog/racial-disparities-in-income-andpoverty-remain-largely-unchanged-amid-strong-income-growth-in-2019/.
57 Id.
58 Parental Substance Abuse and Child Welfare, Kempe.org (Nov. 20, 2019), http://www.kempe.org/parentalsubstance-use-and-child-welfare/ (Citing that 1 in 8 children lived in homes with at least one parent dependent on
alcohol or drugs from 2009 to 2014); Kristin Sepulveda & Sarah C. Williams, , Child Trends (Feb. 26, 2019),
https://www.childtrends.org/blog/one-in-three-children-entered-foster-care-in-fy-2017-because-of-parental-drugabuse.
59 Theodore J. Stein, The Adoption and Safe Families Act: How Congress Overlooks Available Data and Ignores
Systemic Obstacles in Its Pursuit of Political Goals, 25 Child. & Youth Servs. Rev. 669, 678 (2003).
60 Sepulveda , note 58.
61 Id.
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used to take several hours in court. Now they take a matter of minutes. I just look at the medical
records and the case goes by pretty quickly.”62
C. The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997
When children are removed from the home, they are often placed in foster care when
kinship placement is unavailable. In 1990, 400,000 children had entered the foster care system in
the United States.63 The focus of the child welfare system at the time was on reunification of the
child with their birth family.64 However, following a few high-profile cases across the nation
involving the death or grievous bodily injury of children who were returned to their families by
state child welfare agencies, Congress became concerned and passed legislation that erred on the
side of caution.65 With their concern came the iteration of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of
1997 (ASFA).66 President Bill Clinton signed the legislation into law with overwhelming
bipartisan support.67 The driving force of AFSA was to change the focus of child welfare from
family reunification to “permanency,” and to reduce the number of children in the foster care
system.68 One drafter of ASFA, Richard Gelles, the Dean of the School of Social Work at the
University of Pennsylvania, stated that “we are going to terminate parental rights that in the past

62

Anita Wadhwani, Tennessee parents lose kids as opioid crisis rages on, Tennessean (Nov. 26, 2016, 10:02PM),
https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/investigations/2016/11/26/nas-loss-parental-rights/94231538/.
63 Child Trends, Foster Care (May 24, 2018), https://www.childtrends.org/indicators/foster-care.
64 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum.Servs., Child Welfare Information Gateway, Concept and History of Permanency in
U.S. Child Welfare, https://www.childwelfare.gov/topics/permanency/overview/history/ (last visited on Jan. 13,
2021).
65 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding ASFA, 63 F.R. 50057, 50073 (1998). In particular, many children in
New York City died in the 1990s after being returned to their parents. One famous case was that of six -year-old
Elisia Izquierdo, who was murdered by her mother after being returned to her care despite a previous removal by the
city agency. The public outcry following the murder of Elisia prompted New York City to upend its child welfare
services. Charlie Leduff, Woman Sentenced in Daughter’s Death, N.Y. Times (Aug. 1, 1996),
https://www.nytimes.com/1996/08/01/nyregion/woman-sentenced-in-daughter-s-death.html.
66

Chereese M. Phillips & Aaron Mann, Historical Analysis of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 , 23 J.
Hum. Behav. in the Soc. Environ. 862 (2013).
67 Id. at 865.
68 Id. at 866.
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we would not have terminated…[and] remove children from the home in the past we would not
have.”69 According to Gelles, “that was the price-tag for the safety of the child.”70 Another
drafter of ASFA, Dr. Cassie Bevan, who was an advisor for Congressional members and their
staffs, also expressed concern for children “languishing” in foster care. 71 She stated that she was
concerned “with the sense of time of the child” as they waited for a disposition in their case. 72 In
hearings discussing the Act, legislators echoed concerns that children were being returned to
“harmful families” and pitted the interests of the child and the parent as adversarial. 73 A leading
sponsor of ASFA, Rhode Island Republican Senator John H. Chafee, proclaimed “we will not
continue the current system of always putting the needs and rights of the biological parents
first.”74 Senator Chafee proclaimed that “some families simply cannot and should not be kept
together.”75
In passing ASFA, Congress made its intent clear by stating that “the child’s health and
safety shall be the paramount concern.”76 ASFA places permanency above family reunification,
making adoption the primary option.77 For example, ASFA requires state agencies to engage in
concurrent planning, exploring adoptive or other alternate permanency options while reasonable
efforts towards reunification are ongoing. 78 In fact, ASFA increased the money provided to states
69

Kim Phagan-Hansel, One Million Adoptions Later: Adoption and Safe Families Act at 20, The Imprint (Nov. 28,
2018), https://imprintnews.org/adoption/one-million-adoptions-later-adoption-safe-families-act-at-20/32582 . See
also Libby S. Adler, The Meanings of Permanence: A Critical Analysis of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of
1997, 38 Harv. J. on Legis. 1, 2 (2001).
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Katharine Seelye, Clinton to Approve Sweeping Shift in Adoption , N.Y. Times (Nov. 17, 1997),
https://www.nytimes.com/1997/11/17/us/clinton-to-approve-sweeping-shift-in-adoption.html.
75 Id.
76 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A).
77 In re James G., 943 A.2d 53, 74 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (“Generally, [ASFA] is designed to promote the
adoption of children in foster care.”).
78 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)(iii). See also Jim Moye, It's A Hard Knock Life: Does the Adoption and Safe Families Act
of 1997 Adequately Address Problems in the Child Welfare System? , 39 Harv. J. on Legis. 375, 381 (2002).
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per foster child adopted beyond the expected base level, from $2,000 to $4,000.79 As wellintentioned as ASFA was, critics argue that the intent of Congress was not realized because
ASFA forces state agencies to err on the side of caution and remove the child wit hout adequately
addressing the specific needs of the family. 80
Under ASFA, state agencies must initiate a case plan when they place removed children
in foster care.81 A case plan (also referred to as a service plan) is a written document that details
the plan for assuring the child is properly cared for and facilitates either the reunification of the
child with their family or the permanent placement of the child elsewhere. 82 For reunification,
the service plan should be tailored to the specific needs of each family. 83 Within the service plan,
the state agency details the issues that warranted state intervention. 84 State agencies often cite
issues in service plans that tend to be associated with poverty. Some commonly cited issues in
service plans include inadequate housing (referred to as environmental neglect), substance abuse,
and parenting issues (such as inadequate care of an infant and inappropriate discipline). 85 The
service plan also includes recommendations on how to fix cited issues. 86 The recommendations
are often carried out through the implementation of services. ASFA defines services as “timelimited reunification services.”87 These services may include mental health services and
David J. Herring, The Adoption and Safe Families Act – Hope and Its Subversion, 34 Fam. Law Quarterly 329,
340 (2000)(arguing that increased adoption payments would not lead to more adoptions and should be used by states
for family reunification services.).
80 Phillips, supra note 56, at 866 (In 1997, U.S. Representative Patsy Mink was the only congressperson who
testified directly against ASFA, where she stated the government was “overstepping its bounds” and despite the
intent of the government, the legislation “unfairly penalized the poor for not addressing the underlying problems of
poverty and child maltreatment.”).
81 42 U.S.C § 671(a)(16).
82 42 U.S.C. 675(a)(1)(B).
83 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Child Welfare Info. Gateway, Reunification: Bringing your children home
from foster care (Children’s Bureau 2016).
84 Id.
85 Cahn, supra note 48, at 1196. See also Daan Braveman & Sarah Ramsey, When Welfare Ends: Removing
Children from the Home for Poverty Alone, 70 Temp. L. Rev. 447, 461 (1997).
86 Reunification, supra note 83.
87 42 U.S.C. § 629.
79
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counseling, substance abuse treatment, and assistance finding adequate housing and
employment.88 However, ASFA imposes a timeline on how long the service plan may be
implemented before termination proceedings must be brought. 89 Due to this timeline, services
may not be enough to help parents remedy cited problems.90
One of the most controversial sections of ASFA enshrined in 42 U.S.C. § 675(E), is
known as the 15/22-months rule.91 The rule requires states which receive federal funding for
child welfare services to initiate or join proceedings to terminate parental rights for children who
have been in foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months. 92 There are three exceptions to the
rule. A state may not initiate termination of parental rights proceedings when: (i) the child is
living with kinship relatives; (ii) the agency provides a compelling reason why termination of
parental rights is not in the best interest of the child ; or (iii) the state has failed to provide
services for reunification.93 The third exception, which will be the focal point of this Paper,
concerns the failure of the state to provide services for reunification or engage in “reasonable
efforts” to keep the family together before termination of parental rights. 94
Whereas ASFA only requires the state to file a petition to terminate parental rights, many
states have adopted the 15/22-months rule as an independent grounds for termination of parental
rights.95 Parents have successfully challenged the constitutionality of the 15/22-months rule as an

88

Reunification, supra note 83.
42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E).
90 Will L. Crossley, Defining Reasonable Efforts: Demystifying the State's Burden Under Federal Child Protection
Legislation, 12 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 259, 263 (2003) (Arguing that the timeline under ASFA for reasonable efforts is
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independent grounds for termination of parental rights. 96 In 2001, the Illinois Supreme Court
held the 15/22-months rule as a grounds for termination was unconstitutional.97 The state statute
allowed a child to be adjudicated neglected for being in foster care for 15 of the most recent 22
months.98 The State asserted that the statute served two compelling interests: (1) ensuring the
safety and welfare of children and (2) achieving permanency by limiting the time a child spends
in foster care.99
The Illinois court found the statute was unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored
to serve the compelling interests advanced by the state. 100 The court found the 15/22-months
grounds for termination of parental rights allowed the state to prove a parent was unfit without
any reference to parental conduct.101 The court noted while other grounds, such as addiction, had
a time frame tied to the conduct of the parent, the 15/22-months grounds did not.102 The court
found that many cases existed where the length of time a child spent in foster care was due to
circumstances beyond the control of the parent. 103 As to the specific case before it, the court
found that nine of the 15 months included in the petition by the state were “directly attributable
to continuances and court delays” which were unrelated to the question of whether the subject parent had satisfactorily complied with reunification efforts. 104 As a result, the Court held the
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96 In re H.G., 757 N.E.2d 864 (Ill. 2001).
97 Id. at 874.
98 Id. at 868, 870. See also 750 I LL . C OMP. STAT . ANN. 50/1(D)(M-1) (WEST 1998).
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15/22-months grounds unconstitutional because the rights of a parent to their child would be
terminated due to no fault of their own. 105
II.

Reasonable Efforts

Generally, a state agency should make a “reasonable effort” to ensure that services are
provided as the parent works to satisfactorily comply with the service plan for reunification.106
“Reasonable efforts” towards the goal of reunification include services provided to the parent
and child aimed at resolving the issues that prompted the initial removal, such as referrals to
substance abuse treatment and parenting classes. 107 The term “reasonable efforts” is not defined
within the AFSA or any other federal law. In its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, DHHS
addressed the lack of a definition for “reasonable efforts.” 108 In effect, DHHS stated that
providing a definition would remove the flexibility and discretion of the case-by-case analysis
engaged in by courts.109 Further, DHHS reasoned that since family law is the province of state
courts, a federal definition would impose on state sovereignty.110 Instead of a definition, DHHS
provided open questions courts could utilize as guides to reach their decisions. 111 The questions
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include ensuring the service plan is individualized to each family and whether limitations exist as
to service availability.112
Despite the inclusion of “reasonable efforts” within the text of ASFA, the law does not
affirmatively require the states to engage in reasonable efforts to reunify families. 113 Section 15
of 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) provides that the state should engage in reasonable efforts to prevent the
removal of the child from the home and, if removed, to ensure the child can be returned safely.114
However, ASFA only provides for circumstances where states are excused from engaging in
reasonable efforts to provide reunification services. 115 One of the circumstances is when a court
has determined that continued reasonable efforts are futile and inconsistent with the permanency
plan the State has created for the child. 116 In practice, because the State is required to engage in
concurrent planning for permanency and adoption is the primary consideration under ASFA,
15(C) requires the state to devote most of its “reasonable efforts” to placing the child elsewhere.
This implies that a state must start “reasonable efforts” towards reunification with the parent, but
is under no affirmative obligation to continue when reunification efforts conflict with their
permanency plan.
A. Reasonable Efforts According to State Statutes
Without a uniform federal definition, states that have adopted ASFA have taken different
stances on what standard governs “reasonable efforts” when determining whether state agencies
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sufficiently engaged in reunification efforts. 117 States like New York, South Dakota and
Colorado have strong “reasonable efforts” statutes. 118 In New York, “reasonable efforts” requires
state agencies to make “diligent efforts” to help parents, including providing them with services
and assistance that address the primary issues that led to state intervention in the family.119 In
Arkansas, “reasonable efforts” requires state agencies to utilize all available services to preserve
the family, which may include cash assistance, transportation, and family therapy. 120 In contrast,
states like Georgia, Connecticut, and New Hampshire have not defined the term as robustly in
their state statutes. In Georgia, it is indistinctly defined as “due diligence and the provision of
appropriate services.”121 Whereas Georgia provides a cursory definition, Connecticut and New
Hampshire instruct courts to define what reasonable efforts means. In Connecticut, the statute
does not provide a separate definition and instead instructs courts to determine whether the state
“made reasonable efforts” to keep the child with their family and “if such efforts were not made,
whether such reasonable efforts were not possible.”122 In New Hampshire, the statute refers to
“reasonable efforts” in subjective terms, instructing courts to determine whether “services […]
have been accessible, available, and appropriate.”123
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B. Reasonable Efforts According to Courts
In termination of parental rights cases, “courts possess an unusual level of discretion,”
which makes decisions “particularly vulnerable to subjective judgments based on cultural or
class bias.”124 In cases where parents argue the state agency did not engage in reasonable efforts,
the decision of the court is usually dispositive in termination of parental rights. 125 Courts have
also interpreted the meaning of “reasonable efforts” in several states. Without a robust statutory
definition in Connecticut, courts have interpreted “reasonable efforts” to mean a state agency
must do “everything reasonable, not everything possible.”126 The Utah Court of Appeals has
defined “reasonable efforts” as a “fair and serious attempt [by the state] to reunify a child with a
parent.”127 In Maryland, courts have interpreted “reasonable efforts” in accordance with their
state statute as “efforts that are reasonably likely to achieve” the prevention of the child from
being removed from home or finalizing the permanency plan and meeting the needs of the
child.128
Courts tend to rule in favor of state agencies in termination of parental rights cases. 129
The reasoning for courts reflects the prioritization of the best interest of the child over family
reunification as required by ASFA, and assumes that the best interests of the child is a quick
resolution.130 These cases are often twofold.131 First, the scenario is a “double edged sword”
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since the state both provides reunification services to the family and plans alternate permanency
options for the child, essentially acting as both the rehabilitator and prosecutor in termination of
parental rights cases.132 Second, courts are also faced with a dual reality, where they must
account for both the financial and qualitative limitations on the services provided by state
agencies and inability of parents to take advantage of said services to cure serious deficiencies
within the statutory time period.133
It is important to note that most cases deciding whether the state engaged in reasonable
efforts are appellate decisions. With trial courts being granted discretion to determine whether a
state has engaged in reasonable efforts, the only hope for parents whose rights have been
terminated is to appeal the decision. Generally, the standard of review in termination of parental
rights cases is clear error.134 Appellate courts will defer to the factual findings of the trial court if
a reasonable trier of fact would have reached the same conclusion based on the evidence. 135 For
instance, a Florida appellate court stated that although the determination that the mother failed to
comply with her case plan was “questionable,” it would not disturb the findings of the trial court
because they are “clothed with the presumption of correctness.”136 The standard of review leaves
parents with little recourse when they are challenging the efforts of the state to reunify because
an appellate court will not find clear error unless the decision is “against the weight of the
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evidence.”137 In turn, the parent must wait until long after their parental rights have been
terminated to show that the trial court made a clear error and this error resulted in an order for
termination of parental rights that was not in the best interest of the child. 138 Unless the parent
obtains a stay of the trial court’s judgment of termination, this means that the parent will have no
visitation pending the appeal, further eroding the parent’s relationship with the child. 139
Courts have found that termination was not in the best interest of the child where the
actions of the state agency contributed to the termination of parental rights because they did not
engage in reasonable efforts to provide reunification services. 140 In In re James G., the Court of
Special Appeals in Maryland reversed the termination of the parental rights of the father after
finding the state did not make reasonable efforts to reunify him and his child. 141 The Department
met with the father once.142 They directed the father to find a job and stable housing.143
However, the father had expressed that it was difficult for him to find employment because he
did not have enough experience.144 The father had secured a temporary job through an
employment agency, but it did not pay him enough to secure housing. 145 The Department also
did not provide the father with housing assistance. 146 The Department explained their failure to
provide housing assistance was due to the father not being gainfully employed. 147 The state soon
petitioned for termination pursuant to the 15/22-months rule, claiming that the child was in foster
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care for too long.148 The lower court made no finding that the father was an unfit parent. 149 In
fact, one caseworker at the contested hearing admitted that “if not for the [lack of more stable
employment and housing],” they would have reunified the father with the child. 150
The James G. court held that “the passage of 22 months is not, standing alone, a
sufficient justification for abridgement of parental rights” when the state did not engage in
reasonable efforts.151 The court found the state only sent the father one job referral to a job he
was not qualified for.152 The court found that although the father did not follow up with the state,
the state took no further action to help the father find employment. 153 Further, the court found the
father never rejected the little help he did receive. 154 The court held that “reasonable efforts”
implicitly required the state to offer services that address “both the root causes [for removal] and
the effect of the problem.”155 In reversing the termination of parental rights order, the court
stated that “the passage of time is not a substitute for reasonable efforts.” 156
In In re T.W., an Indiana appellate court found that the state did not engage in reasonable
efforts to reunify the family.157 The father had been incarcerated when the child was born. 158
Once released, he went to the Department and requested help establishing paternity and
obtaining a substance abuse evaluation.159 The father indicated he did not understand how to
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comply with services.160 He also explained he did not have stable housing. 161 The caseworker
promised to help him find a job, housing, and to set up visitation. 162 However, he made no
referral to the father for a parent aide. 163 The father retrieved and filled out the necessary
paternity paperwork, but mistakenly returned it to the Department for the caseworker to file. 164
Instead of contacting the father to correct the mistake, the caseworker allowed two weeks to pass
and put the papers in his file.165 The caseworker admitted at the hearing that “at that point, [he
decided] the child was better off with someone else” because the father failed to retrieve the
papers.166 The caseworker also mailed referral papers for drug screening to an initial address the
father provided, but the father had since moved. 167 The caseworker also unilaterally cancelled the
visitation he set up for the father.168
In reversing the termination of parental rights, the T.W. court held that although the
Indiana state statute did not explicitly require state agencies to provide families with services
prior to petitioning for termination of parental rights, unless an exception applied, the state had
an obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunify parents and children. 169 The court found the
state failed to engage in reasonable efforts where they took no action concerning the paternity
paperwork of the father, mailed a referral for drug screens to an address listed for the father even
though they knew he was homeless, unilaterally cancelled visits, and made no referral for a

160

Id.
Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 613-15.
161

22

parent aide.170 The court stated that the “father [was] entitled to try and become a safe and
appropriate parent to [the child], and [the Department was] required to help him do so.”171
Even when parents are receiving some help from the state, the help they receive may not
be enough to overcome the challenges poverty presents. 172 The Court of Special Appeals in
Maryland addressed the issue of “poverty alone cases” in its 2007 decision vacating and
remanding an order of termination of parental rights.173 In Rashawn H., the court held that
conditions like poverty or homelessness alone would not justify the termination of parental
rights.174 The subject children were adjudicated children in need due to lack of a permanent
residence.175 The mother suffered from lifelong poverty and was intellectually disabled. 176 The
service plan required the mother to find stable employment and housing. 177 The mother was able
to secure an apartment, but, according to the state, the apartment was not large enough to
accommodate her and the children.178 The mother was ineligible for most government housing
programs due to her scattered employment history and her history of evictions due to drugdealing.179 Despite the efforts of the mother, the state was unsatisfied and petitioned for
termination of parental rights.180
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The Rashawn H. court acknowledged that while that statute did not require the state to
“bring the family out of poverty,” it also did not permit the state to ignore reasonable efforts and
“leave parents in need adrift and then take their children away.” 181 The court held the state “must
provide reasonable assistance in helping parents.”182 The court vacated and remanded the order
for two reasons.183 First, the court found the state made no showing that termination was in the
best interest of the children because they presented insufficient evidence as to why the state was
better suited than the mother to care for the children.184 Second, the court found the lower court
erred when it made a finding that the mother “did a pretty good job” at maintaining contact with
the state and complying with her case plan, yet ruled that “her efforts were insufficient” to keep
the children safe and healthy.185
The Rashawn H. decision can be contrasted with a decision from the Michigan Supreme
Court seven years earlier ruling differently. 186 In In re Trejo, the struggling mother had turned to
the state for help housing her children until she could find suitable housing. 187 The children were
placed in foster care while she worked to find an apartment. 188 The state, however, provided no
assistance beyond giving the mother a list of low-income housing options.189 The state initiated
termination of parent rights proceedings based on two grounds: (1) that the children had been in
foster care for more than 182 days and (2) that the mother had failed to provide for her children
and there was no reasonable expectation she would be able to within a reasonable time.190 The
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lower court granted the petition for termination.191 The Michigan Supreme Court held that there
was no error in the lower court finding that the mother could not rectify her housing situation
within a reasonable time period.192
The decision of the Trejo court was incongruent with the actual efforts of the mother
prior to termination. The mother was required to find a two- or three-bedroom apartment within
the time period.193 The record showed that the mother had moved frequently but had been trying
to secure housing.194 The mother had secured two appropriate apartments, but lost them because
she did not have enough money.195 In fact, on the day of the termination of parental rights
proceedings, the mother had been on a waiting list for a two-bedroom apartment.196 The court
placed the onus of finding housing solely on the mother with virtually no help from the agency to
which she had turned for help.197 This furthers a system where impoverished parents have
nowhere else to go for help, relying on the same people who are literally working against
them.198
In In re Aaron D., the Supreme Court of Nebraska reversed an order for the termination
of parental rights and held that termination based on the 15/22-months rule was inappropriate
where the actions of the state created impediments to reunification.199 The mother was an
immigrant from Mexico and did not speak English. 200 She had multiple children, including a
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child with special needs.201 The State had removed her nine-year-old son from her following an
incident where he touched his younger sister inappropriately. 202 The case plan required the
mother to find safe housing, stable employment, and to parent her children appropriately. 203
However, the caseworker only provided the mother with a case plan in English. 204 The mother
learned what the requirements were after finding someone to translate the case plan for her. 205
The mother struggled to find housing because she had been evicted twice from her home. 206 The
mother also struggled to find stable employment because of her immigration status.207 At the
time of the hearing, the mother was paying for rent, bills, and groceries by using government
assistance and “selling noodle and tamales” to people. 208 The mother also inconsistently saw the
family support provider for parenting classes because the location was far away and she had no
driver’s license and no transportation.209 When she did attend sessions with the provider, she
actively participated and successfully completed all the assignments. 210 The mother was also
unable to consistently visit the child because the child was placed in a foster home far away. 211
She could not travel because she gave birth to a new child and was the sole caregiver for her
other children.212 When the mother visited with the child, the support worker prohibited her from
speaking to the child in Spanish, so she had to rely on the limited translation of the worker to
communicate.213
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The state initiated termination of parental rights proceedings based on the 15/22-months
rule.214 The trial court terminated the parental rights of the mother. 215 In reversing the order, the
Aaron D. court found termination was not warranted because the record showed the mother had
complied with some of the requirements of the case plan, but that “her opportunities for
compliance may have been limited.”216 The court found that the state could not show that
termination was warranted “by implementing an unreasonable [case] plan.”217 The court noted
that the difficulties the mother faced in finding a job, housing, and attending visitation were due
to issues beyond her control.218 The court found that the visitation schedule was destined to fail
“not necessarily because [the mother] was unfit, but because she was poor and the child was
located too far away.”219 The court found that although some of the challenges the mother faced
were self-inflicted, other challenges “were placed in her path by the department and other
circumstances.”220
Courts have found that the state did not engage in reasonable efforts where they had not
provided the parent with quality substance abuse treatment and placed the responsibility on the
parent to find their own treatment.221 In In re Children of T.R., the state petitioned to terminate
the parental rights of the father on 15/22-months rule grounds.222 The parental rights of the father
were terminated after the lower court found that due to his substance abuse, he was unfit to
parent the child and reasonable efforts to remedy the situation in time were futile. 223 On appeal,
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the court agreed with the father that “merely testing a parent for chemical use” does not
constitute reasonable efforts to remedy substance abuse.224 The court held that substance abuse
alone is not a grounds for parental unfitness. 225 The court stated that the state must prove that the
nature of the substance abuse renders the parent unable to care for the child. 226
In reversing the termination of parental rights order, the T.R. court found that the state
was aware of the severity of the substance abuse of father, yet opted not to offer him inpatient
treatment.227 The court also found that it was unreasonable for the state to recommend to the
father that he “simply abstain from drugs and alcohol.”228 The court found the state also offered
the father no psychological help as to assist him in understanding the true nature of the
proceedings against him.229 The court stated that the although the father had been amenable and
willing to comply with the case plan, the conduct of the state clearly demonstrated that they
never intended to place the child with the father in the first place. 230
Courts have found that a state has failed to engage in reasonable efforts when they do not
tailor the case plan to the specific needs of the parent. 231 In In re S.J., the Washington Court of
Appeals reversed an order for termination of parental rights because the state failed to engage in
reasonable efforts and found that their failure resulted in the termination. 232 The court found that
the state failed to offer the mother the necessary mental health services she needed to continue
her bond with the child.233 The court found that the mother had cured most of the deficiencies

224

Id. at 664-65.
Id.at 663.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 665-66.
228 Id.
229 Id. at 666.
230 Id.
231 In re: S.J., 256 P.3d 470, 474 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
232 Id.
233 Id. at 474.
225

28

that warranted state intervention.234 The state required the mother to find employment and safe
housing and to undergo parenting classes, and psychiatric and substance abuse treatment. 235 The
mother completed drug treatment, enrolled in school, found a job, established an appropriate
home for the children, and attended parenting classes. 236
However, the S.J. court found that state did not order a psychological evaluation for the
mother until after she completed drug treatment, pursuant to court order. 237 Further, the state did
not provide bonding-and-attachment services for the mother during visits with her child.238 The
mother needed the services to bond with the child because he was “a difficult child […] with
significant behavior problems.”239 Without these services, the mother was unable to show that
she and the child were still bonded, which is an integral part of the reunification efforts of a
parent.240 This is evidenced in the findings of fact made by the trial court, which stated that the
mother “had failed to repair her relationship with [the child]” and “was unlikely to be able to
perceive and cope with [the behavior of the child] in the near future.”241 In reversing the order
for termination, the court held the state was at fault for not providing the necessary bonding
attachment services and mental health counseling to satisfactorily complete her case plan, thus
violating her due process rights.242
Even in cases where the court found the state had engaged in reasonable efforts, the
efforts were arguably not enough to reunify the family. 243 In H.B., the court reversed an order
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terminating the parental rights of the mother because the state did not prove that the child could
not be safely returned home to the mother. 244 The state removed the child from the home because
the home was unsanitary.245 The home had “no running water or electricity” and was covered in
“trash, cat waste, and bugs.”246 The mother explained that she could not afford to pay the electric
and water bills because only the grandmother was employed. 247 The mother was also struggling
with mental health issues.248 After removing the child, the Department instructed the mother to
undergo psychiatric treatment, attend parenting classes, and to work with in-home services.249
The mother worked with the in-home services and underwent the psychological evaluation and
treatment.250 The grandmother paid to restore the electricity and water in the home.251 The state
moved to terminate the parental rights of the mother. 252 The state alleged that the mother failed
to resolve the issues that warranted intervention. 253
In granting the petition for termination of parental rights, the trial court found that the
Department made reasonable efforts to reunify the family by offering her services. 254 On appeal,
the mother argued that the department did not engage in reasonable efforts because they did not
offer to help to restore the electricity and water in the home.255 The H.B. court found that the
mother was correct to point out that the Department did not help her restore the utilities. 256
However, the court affirmed the trial court, finding that the Department engaged in reasonable
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efforts by “schedul[ing] classes and in-home services to improve the mother’s housekeeping
abilities,” which according to the court, were “the main obstacle to family reunification.”257 The
court reversed the termination order because the mother had resolved most of the issues that
caused the removal.258 The home was no longer unsanitary and was safe for the child to return.259
The court found termination was unnecessary where the mother may not be “a model
homemaker,” but was otherwise a fit parent.260
The H.B. court erred when it concluded that the Department engaged in reasonable
efforts. The court stated that the housekeeping of the mother was the primary cause for
removal.261 However, even if the mother had cleaned the entire home until it was spotless, the
electric and water would have still been turned off. The court found that the department removed
the child for “inadequate shelter” which included both the unsanitary condition of the house and
the electric and water.262 The issue could have been resolved by the Department offering the
mother the money to pay her utility bills. The cost of the utility bills is far outweighed by the
psychological cost of removing the child from her mother. In fact, despite the unsanitary
conditions of the apartment, the record contained no evidence that the child was harmed. 263 To
the contrary, the court found that the child was healthy, happy, and “had thrived under the care of
the mother.”264 Instead of removing the child, the Department could have paid the utility bill,
offered the classes to the mother, or offered to help the mother find employment or government
assistance to pay the utility bills. Frankly, the Department could have just offered to help the
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mother clean her home. Instead of admonishing the Department for removing the child for an
issue that could have been resolved easily, the court affirmed that the Department could do the
bare minimum when working to reunify families.
These decisions only highlight the issues caused by the lack of a definition regarding
“reasonable efforts.” Without a uniform definition, courts are given the discretion to engage in a
case-by-case analysis where class and cultural biases will likely influence their decisions. 265
These decisions do not consider how difficult and time-consuming it is for parents to rectify the
issues cited by state agencies. Parents engage in a juggling act when they are trying to complete
substance abuse treatment, find housing, and continue their relationship with their child all at
once. Further, despite the grand statements by courts that “substance abuse” or “poverty” alone
will not justify the termination of parental rights, they place no responsibility upon state agencies
beyond the bare minimum to help parents toward reunification. In many cases, once a parent
appears in front of a judge, the damage has already been done. By then, the 15/22-months time
period has run, and parents no longer have time to complete their case plans. When courts find
that the state has engaged in reasonable efforts, they tend to skip issues that could have been
remedied by the department, like cleaning up the home in H.B. and offering the necessary classes
and substance abuse treatment in S.J. and T.R., respectively. Courts also tend to rush through
issues that take significant time to resolve, like the mother searching for housing in Trejo and the
father searching for work in James G. As Judge Justine Wise Polier emphasized in her 1968
book, “the lack of appropriate services by the social agencies [has been] sanction[ed] and
subsidized by court action.”266
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Appellate courts cannot appreciate from the cold record the issues parents deal with while
trying to comply with their case plans. This is especially true where state agencies present the
actions they took to help the parent, but never clarify whether those actions were sufficient. Most
parents involved with the child welfare system are poor, so appealing a termination order can be
just as (if not more) time-consuming and expensive as working towards reunification. Parents
must wait for an appellate court to hear their case and hopefully rule in their favor. Meanwhile,
their children remain separated from their parents. Yet, as long as a state engages in what can
best be characterized as token efforts, courts are likely to find that they have engaged in
reasonable efforts. Without adequate guidance, courts across the country will continue to rule
subjectively on whether a state has truly engaged in reasonable efforts and any hope parents had
for reunification will mean nothing.
III.

Impact of the ASFA 15/22-months Rule on Families

The timeline imposed by ASFA provides states with an avenue where they only need to
engage in reasonable efforts for an arbitrary amount of time. Some opponents have called for the
repeal of the 15/22-months rule.267 However, removing the time period itself would not solve the
problems that the legislation was originally intended to fix. Removing the timeline would again
leave children to languish in foster care for an indeterminate amount of time. Further,
lengthening the time period would have the same effect. 268 The best solution is not to attack the
time period, but rather to attack the reasonable efforts portion of the legislation. Providing a clear
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and substantive definition of reasonable efforts would ensure that state agencies provide quality
services for family preservation.
The impact both removal and foster care have on children is impossible to ignore. In 2019,
over 672,000 children spent time in the foster care system. 269 Children remain in foster care for a
year and a half on average in the United States.270 Children have a right to the care and
companionship of their natural families.271 Instead of this right being prioritized, it is subjugated
to the interest of the state in freeing at-risk children for adoption.272 Children whose parents had
their rights involuntarily terminated spend about a year and a half waiting to be adopted. 273 As a
result, many children suffer psychological damage as a result of being removed from their
homes.274 While their parents are attempting to ameliorate issues, the emotional bond of the child
to their family may be severely disrupted, through no fault of their own.
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Parents are expected to turn their lives around dramatically when state agencies are involved
with their families. Against the backdrop of the 15/22-months timeline imposed by ASFA, the
expectations of state agencies are dissonant from the reality for many parents. Consider the
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following example: a parent is tasked by a state agency to (1) find stable employment, (2) secure
adequate housing, and (3) complete substance abuse treatment. The average price for a two- or
three-bedroom apartment nationally is between $1,800 to $2,000 per month, respectively.277
These rent prices do not account for deposits, insurance, utilities, and other collateral expenses.
For employment, many parents involved with the child welfare system may only qualify for
minimum wage employment. The federal minimum wage in the United States has remained
stagnant at only $7.25 per hour.278 Data has shown that as of 2020, full-time minimum wage
workers cannot afford a two-bedroom apartment anywhere in the United States. 279 To afford a
two-bedroom apartment at fair market value, a minimum wage worker must work at least 97
hours a week.280 If a family qualifies for Section 8, or government subsidized, housing, a person
may spend months or even years on a waiting list. 281 Meanwhile, substance abuse treatment
depends on the nature and severity of the addiction of the parent. The National Institute for Drug
Abuse notes that both inpatient and outpatient treatment should last at least 90 days. 282 People
who complete substance abuse treatment are forty to sixty percent likely to relapse before they
fully recover.283 With all these different situations co-occurring, working toward reunification
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becomes a seemingly insurmountable feat for some parents, especially before their child spends
15 of the most recent 22 months in foster care.
IV.

The Current State of Federal Child Welfare Funding

Whereas parents are not extended the grace of attempting to comply with their case plans,
state agencies are often excused from their obligations due to massive caseloads and inadequate
state funding.284 Funding for foster care and adoption is allocated through Title IV-E of the
Social Security Act.285 Currently, almost five to six billion dollars is allocated to reimbursing
states for foster care expenses.286 The United States Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) has argued that allowing for unlimited spending in the area of foster care has not
resulted in more positive outcomes, especially regarding preventative services (i.e. reunification
efforts). DHHS found that if more money was allocated to preventative services to keep the child
in the home, then the child welfare system would function more effectively. 287 In total, the
federal government spends almost ten times more on foster care than on reunification services.288
A report found that in 2016, state and local governments spent $16.4 billion on child welfare
services.289 The report found that while half of the funding was used for out-of-home placement
options, only 16% of the funding was used for preventative services.290 In New Jersey, 92% of
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federal funding in 2016 was spent on child protection and out-of-home placements, but only 6%
on preventative services.291 The constant investment in foster care comes at a time where the
nation is experiencing a foster parent shortage, where the demand for foster homes far outweighs
the supply.292
However, as with all federal funding, there are restraints. One report found that the
limitations placed on how and how much of the funding is used has constrained many state
agencies that may otherwise be willing to invest in preventative services. 293 States are more
likely to follow the directives of the federal government given that a little over fifty percent of
their funding originates from federal sources.294 States have used the majority of that funding
not only on foster care, but also on maintaining their investigative capacity. 295 Public outcry over
stories of abuse and neglect and the alleged willful blindness of state agencies broadcast on the
news only motivates the state to turn their funding away from reunification services and instead
invest in yet another avenue of policing.296
States are still better situated to shoulder the costs that are associated with investing in
preventative services. Title IV-E waivers, called Child Welfare Waiver Demonstrations, provide
states with the opportunity to apply for flexibility with their funding. 297 The waivers are given for
a five-year term and allow state agencies to be creative and redesign a variety of available
services to improve their outcomes, such as the expansion of job training and parent-child
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improvement programs.298 States that apply for a waiver would have the latitude to pursue a
family-focused agenda, where foster care is a last resort instead of the first line of defense.
The Trump administration recently passed legislation meant to change how funding for foster
care is allocated. The Family First Prevention Services Act of 2018 (FFPSA) appropriates money
for “time limited” services for twelve months to prevent children from being placed in foster
care.299 In particular, the services should address mental health, substance abuse treatment (in
response to the opioid crisis), and in-home parent skill-based programs.300 Under the FFPSA,
cases that qualify involve children who would have been candidates for foster care. 301 While
advocates within the child welfare system have applauded the new law, the FFPSA shortens the
amount of time families would receive preventative services.302 The FFPSA also does not divert
children away from removal into state custody. The FFPSA also requires the services provided to
meet certain requirements, which would likely require an (expensive) overhaul of current state
programs.303 However, a bill titled the Family First Transition Act was subsequently passed to
provide states with flexible funding to implement the initiatives of the FFPSA. 304 Further, states
are not required to participate in the program. 305
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The money allocated towards foster care and permanency efforts should be invested in
reunification efforts. Some courts have held that “reasonable efforts” require that state agencies
provide direct financial assistance in helping families. 306 In 1990, the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island rendered a pre-ASFA decision where it held that family courts can order state agencies to
provide direct aid for housing assistance prior to filing a petition for termination of parental
rights.307 The court stated that it is within the limits of “reasonable efforts” to require the state to
assistance parents in cases where homelessness is the primary reason for removal. 308 The court
held that a family court may find reasonable efforts have not been made when the state has not
provided the specific assistance necessary to resolve the issues that led to foster care. 309 Further,
in 1997, in Washington State Coalition for the Homeless, the court held that its dependency
statute implicitly allowed the trial court to order the state to provide direct assistance in
homelessness cases.310 The court stated that assistance should include (but is not limited to)
offering transportation, assistance in finding housing, and waiving foster care payments to make
funds available to provide that money to the family.311 In 2006, the Supreme Court of Louisiana
reversed an order of termination of parental rights where the grounds were the failure of the
mother to obtain suitable housing.312 The A.T. court found that while “reasonable efforts” under
Louisiana law did not require the state to provide rent-free housing to parents, the statute did
require the state to direct parents towards agencies that would help them find adequate
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housing.313 The court found the state did not engage in reasonable efforts because the state made
no effort to assist the mother in finding housing. 314 These cases show that without an affirmative
obligation being placed on states to focus on keeping families together, states will not necessarily
engage in the kind of “reasonable efforts” that will ensure family reunification.
V.

Proposal – Defining “Reasonable Efforts”: “Conscious Efforts”

In comparison with “reasonable efforts” under federal legislation, The Indian Child Welfare
Act (ICWA) sets a much higher standard for “reasonable efforts.” Due to the importance of
preserving the American Indian family, ICWA requires “active efforts” by the state to prevent
breaking up an Indian family.315 “Active efforts” is not defined either, however, the state is often
held to a much higher standard than it is in non-ICWA cases.316 For example, in In re E.P.F.L.,
“active efforts” was interpreted to mean a state must show it made active efforts to preserve the
Indian family and was required to prove those efforts were unsuccessful. 317 The court found the
state had shown 21 instances where it engaged in active efforts. 318 While the special protection
afforded tribal connections provides a special justification for imposing a higher standard on
state agencies involved with ICWA families versus non-ICWA families, it is imperative to use
“active efforts” as a guidepost for how to raise the standard under ASFA. A definition for
“reasonable efforts” under ASFA that falls between “active efforts” and “reasonable efforts”
would better serve the goals of the state of protecting children and the rights of parents and
children to the preservation of their families.
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This Paper proposes that the definition for reasonable efforts under ASFA should be
“conscious efforts.” According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, “conscious” is defined as
“done or acting with critical awareness” and “sharing the knowledge or awareness of an inward
state or outward fact.”319 “Efforts” is defined as “a conscious exertion of power” and “a serious
attempt.”320 Together, “conscious efforts” would mean that the state is required to make a serious
attempt to assist families with their problems while remaining aware of the limitations and issues
each family may face to meet their demands. A “conscious efforts” requirement would place an
obligation on the state to provide families with more direct assistance instead of merely
providing recommendations in a case plan. Replacing the word “reasonable” with the word
“conscious” would push back on the judicial notion that “reasonable efforts” means “everything
reasonable, not everything possible” because that statement presupposes that the current efforts
in place are adequate.321 This proposed definition recognizes the financial limitations and
availability of state resources, but does not allow these limitations to substitute for purposeful
action on the part of the state to reunify families. More likely than not, state agencies can assume
the costs of direct assistance.
Taking the federal funds poured into foster care and requiring states to dedicate more of
those funds towards direct housing assistance and other poverty-driven issues would result in
more positive outcomes within the child welfare system. 322 Parents are not infallible. However,
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many parents suffer from drug addiction and mental health issues, while others are working poor
or homeless, struggling to provide. As a result, many cannot satisfactorily complete their service
plans prior to the 15/22-months timeline without more active agency assistance. The proposed
definition would acknowledge that the parent is often making a serious and fair attempt, all while
operating within a rigid socioeconomic system. Some parents may require more of a safety net
from the state to ameliorate issues within the statutory frame under ASFA. More state support of
families would allow parents to truly seek the help they need , especially parents who seek
substance abuse treatment at the behest of the state. Child welfare does not exist in a vacuum.
The proposed definition appreciates the reality that many parents struggle with issues wholly
separate from their ability to parent.
Redefining “reasonable efforts” to “conscious efforts” would also be truer to the
constitutional mandate about the sanctity of the family. Termination of parental rights is not in
the best interest of the child when the parent is facing issues that are beyond their control. In
those cases, more support from the state would be the least restrictive alternative to termination
of parental rights because it would refocus the inquiry as to whether the state made a serious
attempt to keep the family together. Terminating the rights of a parent seeking substance abuse
treatment or employment does not serve the best interest of the child. Terminating parental rights
under these circumstances also does not serve the interest of the state in promoting the welfare of
the child. Placing an affirmative obligation on the state to provide parents with the assistance
they need to improve their lives promotes the well-being of the child. This proposed definition
would also include allowing parents to have frequent contact with their children as they seek
substance abuse treatment or stable housing and employment, so that these issues do not weaken
familial bonds. Just as the Court stated in Santosky, “the parens patriae interest favors
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preservation, not severance, of natural familial bonds.” 323 When state intervention becomes
necessary, the efforts of the state should be focused on supporting the family.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, “reasonable efforts” should be defined within federal legislation. The
proposed definition should be “conscious efforts,” which is defined as requiring the state to make
a serious attempt to assist families while remaining aware of the realities many families face.
This definition would shift the child welfare system from a system that punishes families to one
that supports them. Raising the bar on what constitutes “reasonable efforts” would re-orient
states from prioritizing adoption to prioritizing family integrity. Without the current limitations
attached to federal funding, states would be free to be more solution orientated, thus more
willing to reinvest in family services and programs. With direct help such as more robust
programs and direct cash assistance, parents will be given a fair opportunity to resolve cited
issues prior to the 15/22-months timeline mandated by ASFA. This definition also recognizes
that many parents experience complications that are environmental and not dispositional. No
matter how complicated they may be, the focus of state agencies should be on helping the
existing family of the child, not finding them a new one.
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